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RECONSIDERING LIMITS ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN UNITED STATES AIRLINES
In recent years, the United States airline industry has been
facing financial difficulties.1 Among the major domestic carri-
ers, these financial difficulties have resulted in the closing of
Eastern Airlines, and Pan American World Airways (Pan Am),
and bankruptcy filings by Continental Airlines, America West,
and Trans World Airlines (TWA).2 To face the challenges
ahead, the other major carriers have had to restructure by
scaling down, merging, or consolidating.3 Moreover, "more than
20,000 U.S. employees have lost their jobs since January [1991]
and another 18,000... have been displaced."4
Carriers throughout the industry face a common prob-
lem - the lack of capital.5 The capital intensive nature of the
airline industry, coupled with other factors including the sudden
rise in oil prices associated with the Gulf War,6 aggressive
competition resulting from domestic deregulation,' and ques-
tionable corporate strategies resulting in large corporate debt,'
have led to this capital crunch. Although some carriers with
sufficient capital have survived these hard times, most have
suffered severe financial difficulties.9
'See Thomas Canning, Airline Finances Plunge to New Low, STANDARD &
POOR'S INDUSTRY SURVEYS, AEROSPACE & AIR TRANSPORT CURRENT ANALYSIS,
Oct. 31, 1991, at A1-A3.
2 Free Market Dogma Spells Disaster for U.S. Airlines, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Sept. 30, 1991, at 74 [hereinafter Free Market]; Eric Reguly,
TWA Files for Creditor Protection, FIN. POST, Feb. 3, 1992, at 13.
3 See Kevin C. Murphy & Chin Y. Lim, Stay Overweighted, 3 MORGAN
STANLEY INTERNATIONAL INvESTMENT RESEARCH: GLOBAL AVIATION BIMONTH-
LY 1 (1991).
Free Market, supra note 2, at 74.
s Bruce Noble, formerly of Pan Am and the Trump Shuttle, has said that
the biggest problems facing the U.S. airline industry are "the availability of
capital and access to limited facilities at major business airports." Bill Poling,
Experts and DOT Officials Give Deregulation a Passing Grade, TRAVEL WKLY.,
Sept. 23, 1991, at 133 [hereinafter Poling, Experts and DOT Officials].
6 Fang Yinong, Roundup: U.S. Airline Industry in Deep Trouble, XINHUA
GENERAL NEWS SERVICE, Jan. 14, 1991.
' James Ott, Consolidation of Airlines Threatens Future Competition,
AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 16, 1991, at 30.
8 See Free Market, supra note 2, at 74.
See Canning, supra note 1, at A1-A3.
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After deregulation, the U.S. market could not sufficiently
meet the capital needs of the airlines. Nevertheless, statutory
limits on foreign investment in domestic airlines hampered
attempts by willing foreign investors to supply the airlines'
capital needs. These legally-imposed limits forced many foreign
investors to limit their involvement or avoid investment alto-
gether.'0
This article will examine foreign investment as a possible
source of capital for U.S. airlines. Title IV of the Federal
Aviation Act of 1958 ("FAVA") provides the pertinent law
governing foreign investment in domestic air carriers." Two
overriding concerns relating to foreign investment in the airline
industry are national security and competition concerns. Ironi-
cally, because national security concerns favor more limits on
investment 12 and competition concerns favor fewer limits, 3
an inherent tension exists when attempting to further both
goals by regulating foreign investment. This article asserts that
attempts to increase foreign investment in U.S. airlines beyond
the current levels will sacrifice neither national security nor
competition and, on the contrary, may even further both policy
goals.
This paper will demonstrate that a liberalized foreign invest-
ment policy could benefit U.S. airlines while enhancing competi-
tion and safeguarding national security. The current limits on
foreign investment create artificial barriers to the inflow of
much needed capital for U.S. airlines. Additionally, they do not
necessarily further the policy goals of national security and
enhanced competition. The new proposed limits, however, fall
short of their stated purpose of increasing the amount of foreign
investment beyond the current limits. To increase foreign
investment in U.S. airlines while balancing the goals of national
security and competition, Congress should place statutory limits
10 For a thorough discussion of the economics of deregulation, see Jona-
than B. Wilson, Note, The Lessons of Airline Deregulation and the Challenge
of Foreign Ownership of U.S. Air Carriers, 24 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON.
103 (1990).
n 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301-1557 (West 1976 & Supp. 1991).
12 James Ott, Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers Feared As Limit to
Future Military Airlifts, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., April 22, 1991, at 96.
" Leveraged Buyouts and Foreign Ownership of U.S. Airlines: Hearings on
H.R. 3443 Before the House Subcomm. on Aviation of the Comm. on Public
Works and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 89-91 (1991) [hereinafter
House Hearings] (testimony of Daniel M. Kasper, Harbridge House, Inc.).
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on foreign ownership to 49% of voting interest while allowing
unlimited ownership of nonvoting equity. Furthermore, the
Department of Transportation (DOT) should continue to use its
control test.
Part I provides a background of the U.S. airline industry and
the problems it faces as a result of its lack of capital. Part II
lists the concerns raised by foreign investment in domestic
airlines. Part III outlines the current law on foreign investment
under the FAVA and DOT's interpretation of the FAVA. Part
IV details the current Congressional proposals on limiting
foreign investment and explains why these provisions are
inadequate. Part V argues that although the current law is
preferable to the Congressional proposals, it needs to be further
liberalized to allow for more foreign investment in U.S. airlines.
Increased foreign investment would result in greater competi-
tion and a healthy airline industry without sacrificing national
security which it may, in fact, strengthen.
I. THE U.S. AIRLINE INDUSTRY
Ten participants in the U.S. airline industry are character-
ized as major airlines because they earn over $1 billion in
annual revenues.' 4 U.S. airlines suffered a net loss of approxi-
mately $1.8 billion in 1991"s with the ten major airlines losing
$3.8 billion in 1990.16 Five major airlines have filed for Chap-
ter 11 bankruptcy since 1990," and two have ceased opera-
tions altogether."8
Many reasons account for the financial difficulties facing the
U.S. airline industry. The airline industry's most fundamental
problem lies in the cyclical nature of its earnings.' 9 Airline
4 The ten major airlines are America West, American, Continental, Delta,
Northwest, Pan Am, Southwest, TWA, United, and USAir. Canning, supra
note 1, at Al.
15 Joel Havemann, Europe Apt to See Merger of its Airlines, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 15, 1992, at D3.
16 Canning, supra note 1, at Al.
17 Reguly, supra note 2, at 13. The five major airlines that have filed for
bankruptcy are Pan Am, Continental, TWA, Eastern, and America West. Id.;
Free Market, supra note 2, at 74.
11 The two major airlines no longer operating are Eastern and Pan Am.
Reguly, supra note 2, at 3.
" Nicholas C. Kernstock, Concerns About Leverage Cool Market for Airline
Takeovers, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Nov. 20, 1989, at 71.
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traffic increases in the summer months and slows down during
the winter months.2" Airlines must earn enough in the peak
summer months to survive through the slow winter months. In
addition, the "industry is among the most capital intensive of all
U.S. industries."'" Aside from the airline's need for terminal
buildings, gate slots, and air routes, the clearest and most
visible example of an airline's capital need is the actual air-
plane. In 1989, one Boeing 747-400 cost in excess of $125
million.2 For these reasons, airlines must earn enough during
the upside of the cycle to weather the downside.
In recent years, many U.S. airlines could not survive be-
cause their debt levels increased, causing a capital crunch.2"
Some of this increase directly resulted from voluntary leverag-
ing in the form of leveraged buyouts.2 4 Other causes contribut-
ing significantly to the increased debt included the unexpectedly
high oil prices during the Persian Gulf War,25 the general
economic recession,26 the effects of deregulation and increased
o See id. at 73 (table).
21 Leveraged Buyouts and Foreign Ownership Interests in U.S. Airlines:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 25 (1989) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings] (statement of Timothy Pettee, First Vice President, Airline
Industry Analyst, Merrill Lynch Capital Markets).
2 Id.
s For example, Carl Icahn took TWA private in 1988 in a leveraged buyout
that gave him 90% ownership and too much debt to weather the recession.
Reguly, supra note 2, at 13. Robert Crandall, Chairman of American Airlines,
said that "the airline industry in the United States is literally going broke."
Yinong, supra note 6.
4 House Hearings, supra note 13, at 20 (submission of Representative
William F. Clinger, Jr.). A leveraged buyout (LBO) is an acquisition method
in which the target firm's debt level is increased significantly to finance the
acquisition. See also DALE A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS, AcQUIsI-
TIONS, AND REORGANIZATIONS 12-28 (1991) (quoting Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse
of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept./Oct. 1989, at 61).
25 Yinong, supra note 6. Oil prices jumped significantly on the world
market in the period immediately preceding the Gulf War. Jet fuel prices
skyrocketed to $1.39 per gallon in October 1990 from $0.63 per gallon in
August 1990. Id. "[Alnalysts say an increase of one cent per gallon for
aviation fuel costs [U.S.] airlines an extra 160 million dollars annually." Id.
The rise in jet fuel price is significant considering it represents the second
largest expense for airlines. Jeff Pelline, Some Upbeat Signs for Airlines, S.F.
CHRON., Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl.
2 Canning, supra note 1, at Al.
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competition,27 and simply poor management. 28 A partial solu-
tion to these problems is more capital, which some airlines have
raised by selling assets.29  Others not so fortunate have de-
clared bankruptcy, ceased operations, or merged. 0
These financial difficulties and forced restructurings have
caused the airline industry to consolidate with fewer carriers
acquiring increasing capacity and traffic.31 This dramatic
change in the structure of the airline industry raises serious
competition concerns.3 2 For example, the domestic market
share of the five largest carriers accounted for 72% of the total
market in 1991 compared with only 54% in 1986."3
(See table next page.)
Ott, supra note 7, at 30. Examples of the excessive competition resulting
from deregulation include widespread discounting and market share battles
among airlines. R.J. McAdoo, Airline Industry-Industry Report, 1991 PRUDEN-
TIAL SECuRITms INC. 1.
' Poling, supra note 5, at 133. A typical case of poor management is
USAir's underutilization of its Indianapolis hub. Murphy & Lim, supra note
3, at 12.
' Recent asset sales include the sale of Midway's assets to Northwest, the
sale of TWA's routes to American, the sale of Pan Am's routes to Delta and
United, and the sale of the Pan Am Shuttle to Delta. Canning, supra note 1,
at A3.
30 Id. at A1-A3.
31 See Poling, supra note 5, at 133. Senator Wendell Ford, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Aviation of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation said, "being left in this country with only three or four
carriers ... isn't what we intended when we passed deregulation." Id.
32 Id.
' Murphy & Lim, supra note 3, at 1.
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CONCENTRATION AMONG CARRIERS INCREASING3
1991 Company Market 1985 Company Market
Rank Share Rank Share
_J% % _ __
1 United 18.4 1 American 13.3
2 American 18.2 2 United 12.5
3 Delta 14.9 3 Eastern 10.0
4 Northwest 11.9 4 TWA 9.6
5 Continental 9.4 5 Delta 9.0
6 USAir 7.6 6 Pan [A]m 8.1
7 TWA 6.2 7 NWA 6.7
8 Pan Am 4.9 8 Continental 4.9
9 America West 3.0 9 People 3.3
Express
10 Southwest 2.5 10 Republic 3.2
Others 3.0 Others 19.4
Sources: Department of Transportation and S&P.
II. COMMON CONCERNS RAISED ABOUT
FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The major policy concerns regarding limits on foreign invest-
ment in the domestic airline industry are national security,
competition, reciprocal treatment between nations, and even
distribution among airlines.
A. NATIONAL SECURITY
Foreign ownership of U.S. airlines makes national security
a major concern. 5 The significant role played by U.S. civilian
aircraft in the recent Gulf War makes this fact particularly
relevant. U.S. airlines carried nearly two-thirds of all personnel
Canning, supra note 1, at A3 (table).
Ott, supra note 12, at 96.
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and more than one-quarter of all air cargo for the U.S. Armed
Forces and returned 87% of the troops and 43% of the air cargo
to their home bases" as part of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet
("CRAF") during Operations Desert Shield and Storm.7 When
CRAF is activated, the Military Airlift Command ("MAC") may
call civil aircraft into military service with only twenty-four
hours notice.3" Although airlines participate in CRAF volun-
tarily, airlines that do join the program are contractually obli-
gated to respond with the number of aircraft requested once
called by MAC. 9 In return, the military gives these airlines
preferential treatment in awarding routine military charter
contracts during peacetime.40 Supporters of strong limits on
foreign investment argue that with greater foreign investment,
this voluntary program will not have enough participants.4 '
Moreover, they argue, CRAF would not have enough planes at
its disposal to serve the purpose for which it was established.
B. COMPETITION
Proponents of stringent limits on foreign investment are
further concerned that without these limits, the resulting
consolidation of airlines will inhibit competition. They fear that
more foreign investment will result in a handful of global
airlines that could manipulate the market.42 In this scenario,
entry into the airline industry would become increasingly
difficult, resulting in a global market made up of only a small
number of airlines.43 Additionally, whether U.S. antitrust
' Lester Reingold, CRAF, A "Qualified Success," AIR TRANSPORT WORLD,
August 1991, at 25.
3 Id. CRAF is a military transport program developed during the Korean
War, but not implemented until the Gulf War. Id. at 24.
S8 id.
3 Id. at 24-25.
'0 Id. at 25. Peacetime military charters create a $500 million per year
industry. Id. at 24.
41 Free Market, supra note 2, at 75. As long as CRAF participants can
benefit economically from the program, the number of its participants should
not decrease.
42 Ott, supra note 7, at 30.
' Id. Entry into the industry is difficult because of the limited availability
of facilities, capital, and air routes. "Only a limited number of carriers will be
able to achieve market presence in a sufficient number of large cities to build
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enforcement could effectively counter the global anticompetitive
effects is questionable.44
Competing foreign airlines have provided a significant source
of recent foreign investment in U.S. airlines.4" Proponents of
strong limits worry that by taking an equity stake in domestic
airlines, these foreign airlines, together with the U.S. airline in
which they invested, could be in a position to gain competitive
advantages over other U.S. airlines.46 Alternatively, they
argue that foreign and domestic airlines could share sensitive
information in order to create monopolies in certain areas.47
Finally, they argue that equity stakes in U.S. airlines could
enable foreign airlines to influence bilateral aviation agree-
ments between the U.S. and their countries of origin to their
advantage.4" The concern is that this influence will negatively
affect the position of U.S. airlines vis a vis their foreign competi-
tors by allowing the foreign competitors access to air routes that
were previously accessible only to U.S. airlines.
C. RECIPROCAL TREATMENT
Supporters of strong limits also raise a reciprocal treatment
argument. Reciprocal treatment advocates argue that U.S.
investors should have the same opportunities to invest in
foreign airlines as foreign investors have in U.S. airlines.
a national network." Id. Further concentration is inevitable because few
airports will serve as a hub for more than one airline, according to a report by
the Transportation Research Board released in the Fall of 1991. Id. (referring
to TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH BOARD, WINDS OF CHANGE: DOMESTIC AIR
TRANSPORT SINCE DEREGULATION (1991)).
44 HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEv F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROB-
LEMS 892-894 (3d ed. 1986).
"See Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 23 (statement of Timothy Pettee,
First Vice President, Airline Industry Analyst, Merrill Lynch Capital Mar-
kets).
4House Hearings, supra note 13, at 17-18 (submission of Representative
James L. Oberstar).
"4 Foreign and domestic airlines could share sensitive scheduling, passen-
ger, or reservation system information. They also could make exclusive
arrangements (gates, slots, terminal buildings) to tie the operations of the
airlines together. The proposed amendments to the FAVA limit arrangements
between airlines for airline reservation systems, gates, and slots. H.R. 2074,
102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1991); S. 1628, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1991).
4' Free Market, supra note 2, at 75.
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Therefore, they support limiting foreign investment to those
investors from countries that allow U.S. investment in their own
airlines. Otherwise, they assert, this lack of reciprocity creates
a "one way street" for capital to flow out of the U.S:49 the U.S.
markets would be relatively open to foreign investors, while
foreign markets would be closed to U.S. investors. Exclusion
from foreign airline markets, however, often results not so much
from strict foreign investment rules as from the fact that the
ownership structure of most foreign carriers precludes U.S.
investment. Many foreign airlines are either owned largely by
national governments or are closely held by private interests. 0
U.S. investors are, thus, excluded from investing in most foreign
airline stock on the open market.
D. EVEN DISTRIBUTION
Lastly, proponents of stringent limits are concerned that
foreign investment will be disproportionately distributed to
healthier U.S. airlines instead of to those that truly need the
capital.51 Proponents argue that this uneven distribution will
not help the U.S. airline industry as a whole to grow and to
become more competitive because the capital-poor airlines will
continue to be starved for adequate capital.52
III. CURRENT LAW
A. THE UNDERLYING POLICIES OF THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
OF 1958
The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 ("CAA") regulated the
airline industry at the time when Congress proposed the
FAVA.53 Legislators thought the FAVA was necessary because
49 Weigh Foreign Ownership Carefully, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June
3, 1991, at 7.
°
0 Id.
"' Bill Poling, Foreign Aid for U.S. Airline Industry, TRAVEL WKLY., Feb 28,
1991, at 31.
52 Id.
53 H.R. REP. No. 2254,75th Cong., 3d Sess. 6-9 (1938). Title IV of the CAA
covered economic regulation of airlines. Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 52 Stat.
973, 987-1005 (1938) (amended at 66 Stat. 628 (1952), 69 Stat. 49 (1955), and
71 Stat. 415 (1957)). Title VI of the CAA was later replaced by Title IV of the
FAVA. Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1371-1387 (West 1976 & Supp.
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the CAA had been ineffectively implemented' and did not
adequately address the "ever-growing importance and complexi-
ty of [the] aviation [industry]."55 Legislators used examples of
airline accidents and near misses to illustrate the necessity of
new legislation. A midair collision of two airliners over the
Grand Canyon in 1956 that resulted in the loss of 128 lives
raised public awareness of the need for regulation.5" Following
this disaster, civilian and military aircraft, operating under
separate flight rules, collided on two separate occasions.
These accidents served as an impetus to improve air safety and
to consolidate civilian and military flight rules.
Recognizing the need for new aviation legislation, Congress
passed the FAVA with the dual purposes of improving safety in
aviation and creating a unified system for both civilian and
military aircraft.58 To accomplish this, the FAVA created a
single aviation body, the Federal Aviation Administration
("FAA") which included significant military participation.5 9
This illustrates Congress' recognition of the military's stake in
the proper management of national airspace and national
security interests. ° In a further attempt to preserve national
security, Congress kept in place the CAA requirement of U.S.
citizenship.6
1991).
" For example, the Senate criticized the implementation of the CAA as
follows:
The present Civil Aeronautics Act, at the time of its passage in 1983,
provided a reasonably adequate, unified basis for aviation safety
regulation... vested in an independent Civil Aeronautics Authority
... But the idea of a centralized authority for civil aviation was never
given a real try. Less than 2 years after its establishment, the Civil
Aeronautics Authority was "split down the middle" into entirely
separate rulemaking and operational bodies ....
S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
5 Id. at 6.
56 Id. at 7; see also, H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1958).
57 S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1958). In addition, the Civil
Aeronautics Board reported a total of 971 near misses aloft during 1957. Id.
at 8.
Id. at 6.
59 H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-9 (1958); S. REP. No. 1811,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-20 (1958).
60 H.R. REP. No. 2360, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9 (1958).
61 Id. at 15.
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The FAVA, however, did not significantly amend economic
regulations related to foreign investment in U.S. airlines.62
Congress pursued safety and national security as policy goals,
but neglected other policy concerns, such as competition. The
Legislature's silence on competition concerns was probably due
to the relatively small size and highly regulated state of the
industry at the time of enactment.
B. THE FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
The FAVA regulates operators of air carriers in the United
States by requiring that carriers wishing to engage in air
transportation obtain a certificate of public convenience and
necessity issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board." The Board
will only grant this certificate if the applicant's request is,
among other things, consistent with public convenience and
necessity.' Under the FAVA, an "air carrier" must be a U.S.
citizen engaged in air transportation.65 A U.S. citizen is de-
fined under the statute as:
(a) an individual who is a citizen of the United States or
of one of its possessions, or (b) a partnership of which
each member is such an individual, or (c) a corporation
or association created or organized under the laws of the
United States or of any State, Territory, or possession of
the United States, of which the president and two-thirds
or more of the board of directors and other managing
officers thereof are such individuals and in which at least
75 per centum of the voting interest is owned or con-
trolled by person who are citizens of the United States or
of one of its possessions.66
Congress, therefore, limited foreign ownership to a maximum of
25% of the voting interest in a U.S. airline.
' See generally S. REP. No. 1811, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (1958); H.R. REP.
NO. 2360, 85th Cong. 2d Sess. 15 (1958).
6 49 U.S.C.A. § 1371 (West Supp. 1991).
6 Id. § 1371(d)(1).
6 49 U.S.C. § 1301(3) (1988).
6 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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C. RECENT DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION DECISIONS ON
THE FAVA
In two recent cases, the Department of Transportation
(DOT)67 discussed the citizenship issue in instances where
foreign investors attempted to invest in U.S. airlines. In both
cases, the DOT allowed the foreign investment with slight
modifications. In The Acquisition of Stock in Continental
Airlines Holdings, Inc., by Scandinavian Airlines System
("SAS/ Continental"),' the DOT ruled that the equity position
acquired by Scandinavian Airlines System (SAS) in Continental
Airline's (Continental) parent company, Continental Airlines
Holdings, Inc. ("Holdings") did not affect Continental's status as
a U.S. citizen under the FAVA.69 The DOT reviewed a trans-
action wherein SAS increased its equity in Holdings while
concurrently increasing its representation on the Holdings
Board.v° Before the transaction, SAS held 9.9% of Holdings
stock.7 After the transaction, the SAS stake increased to
16.8% of the total outstanding common stock and 18.4% of the
total voting stock of Holdings.72 The transaction also increased
the number of directors nominated by SAS from one to three, as
the board grew from fourteen to fifteen members, representing
an increase from 7% to 20%.7" SAS, however, proposed limita-
tions on the activities of its nominees to the board, requiring
67 The DOT assumed "authority to approve or disapprove all airline
mergers and acquisitions from the Civil Aeronautics Board on January 1,
1985." Jeffery Donner Brown, Note, Foreign Investment in U.S. Airlines:
What Limits Should Be Placed on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers? 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1269, 1275 (1989).
' The Acquisition of Stock in Continental Airlines Holdings, Inc., by
Scandinavian Airlines Sys., No. 90-9-15, 1990 DOT Av. LEXIS 669 (Sept. 12,
1990) [hereinafter SAS/Continental].
' Id. at *12. "Holdings owns all the outstanding common stock of
Continental." Id. at *5.
70 Id. at *1.
7 1 Id.
72 Id., supra note 68, at *4. Additionally, SAS agreed to limit its holdings
of voting stock to a maximum of 22% for three years. Id. at *5.
7 Id. Since one of the other members of the board was an Australian
citizen, the total number of directors who were foreign nationals or nominees
of foreign entities would have been about 27% of the board. Id. at *7.
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that nominees recuse themselves from situations of potential
conflict between SAS and Continental. 4
The DOT interpreted the statute by developing a two-part
citizenship test to determine whether Continental would remain
a U.S. citizen after the transaction because the FAVA allows
only citizens of the U.S. to hold certificates of public convenience
and necessity. 5 First, the airline must satisfy statutory re-
quirements that "the president and two-thirds of the board of
directors and other managing officers be U.S. citizens and that
at least 75% of the outstanding voting stock be owned by U.S.
citizens." 6  Second, U.S. citizens must actually control the
carrier ("control test").7 7
Under this two-part citizenship test, the DOT decided that
Continental remained a U.S. citizen. 7' First, the President of
Holdings and Continental was a U.S. citizen and more than
two-thirds of the directors and other managing officers of both
companies were U.S. citizens. 9 In addition, U.S. citizens
continued to hold more than 75% of the voting shares thereby
meeting the express statutory requirements.80 Second, the
DOT determined that SAS's 18.4% share of voting rights did not
reflect any real threat to Continental's ability to direct the
affairs of the company."1 Similarly, the actual dollar value of
the SAS acquisition was not large enough to raise concerns that
the size of the investment would enable SAS to exercise con-
trol."2 The DOT also found that SAS's presence on the Board
did not place SAS in a position of control. The DOT noted
specifically SAS's self-imposed limitations to prevent potential
conflicts of interest." The DOT did, however, require Conti-
74 d. at *8.
75 d. at *11.
76 Id. at *11-12.
"Id. at *12. This control test is the DOT's interpretation of the "owned or
controlled" language of the FAVA. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301(16) (West Supp. 1991).
" SAS/Continental, supra note 68, at *12.
79!d.
80 Id. at *12.
81 Id. at *12-13.
82 d. at *13.
' Id. at *13-14. For example, SAS's designated directors would recuse
themselves from participating in any matter which might affect actual or
potential competition with Continental and bilateral or multilateral aviation
negotiations to which SAS or Denmark, Norway, or Sweden would be a party.
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nental and Holdings to report any significant future changes in
their relationship with SAS.'
The DOT decided another case on this issue, The Acquisition
of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc. ("Wings
IF').5 In Wings II, the DOT modified a previous consent de-
cree, The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holding,
Inc. ("Wings P')."6 In Wings I, the DOT ruled that a buyout of
Northwest Airlines jeopardized the airline's status as a U.S.
citizen."7 The DOT was concerned with this buyout because
foreign investors contributed a significant portion of the equity
for the transactions. KLM88 contributed 56.74% of the equi-
ty 9 and Elders" provided another 11.3% of the total equi-
ty.91 Five U.S. citizens contributed the remaining equity.92
Although KLM contributed the majority of the total equity,
it held less than 5% of the Wings voting stock," while Elders
held 15.4% of Wings voting stock. 4 The DOT found that these
voting interests did not violate the statutory prong of the
SAS/Continental two-part citizenship test.9" The DOT did,
This recusal system would prevent these directors from even receiving
documents which would otherwise be unavailable to SAS. Id. at *8.
8Id. at *15.
" The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines, Inc. by Wings Holdings, Inc., No.
91-1-41, 1991 DOT Av. LEXIS 55 (Jan. 23, 1991) [hereinafter Wings II].
8 The Acquisition of Northwest Airlines by Wings Holding, Inc., Order No.
89-9-51, 1989 DOT Av. LEXIS 643 (Sept. 29, 1989) [hereinafter Wings 11.
87 Id. at *13. The buyout in question actually consisted of the purchase of
Northwest's parent company, NWA, Inc., by a holding company established for
this purpose, Wings Holdings, Inc. ("Wings"). Id. at *1.
8 KLM stands for Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maasschappij, a Dutch airline.
Id. at *4.
' KLM provided $350 million in preferred stock and $50 million in
common stock of the $705 million in total equity invested in Wings. Id. at *3-
4, 11.
o Elders, IXL Ltd., is an Australian investment company. Id.
9' Elders provided $80 million of the $705 million. Id. at *10.
Mr. Alfred Checchi, Mr. Gary Wilson, Mr. Frederick Malek, Wings
Associates, L.P., and Bankers Trust New York Corporation. Id. at *3.
93 Id. at *11.
9Id. at *10.
5 Id. at *7. The DOT specifically stated:
this case does not present a problem with the requirement in the
Federal Aviation Act that the President and two-thirds of the board
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however, find a problem with the control prong of the citizen-
ship test - that Northwest be "under the actual control of U.S.
citizens."' The DOT held that KLM was in a position to exer-
cise control over Northwest because of the "multiplicity and
importance of links between KLM and Wings."97 These links
included: the substantial portion of equity contributed by
KLM,ss the right to have one KLM representative sit on the
Board,' the right to name a three-person committee to advise
Wings on Northwest's financial affairs,0 0 and various coopera-
tive working arrangements between Northwest and KILM.' 0 '
The DOT decided not to pursue a citizenship proceeding
when Wings and Northwest agreed to take several steps to
ensure Northwest would remain a U.S. citizen under the
FAVA. 102 However, on January 15, 1991, Northwest filed a
petition with the DOT requesting a modification of the Wings I
order."°3 The DOT changed its position in Wings II and held
of directors and other managing officers be U.S. citizens and that 75
percent of the voting stock in the company be owned or controlled by
U.S. citizens.
Id. at *7-8.
9 Id.
97 Id.
9 Id. at *12-13.
99 Id.
100 Id. at *13.
101 Id. at *14.
102 Id. at *16-17. These steps included: reducing KLM's share of Wings
equity investment from 56.74% to a maximum of 25% without debt interest,
with any excess beyond the 25% going immediately to a voting trust free from
KLM's control; terminating KLMs rights to appoint a financial advisory
committee and requiring the KLM Board member to recuse himself from any
matters in which a conflict of interest could arise; and filing reports of any
ownership changes and agreements between Wings and Northwest with the
DOT. Id. at *16-24.
"o' Wings II, supra note 85, at *8. This petition asked the DOT to:
(1) terminate the requirement 0 that KLM's total equity investment
in Wings be reduced to 25 percent; (2) permit KLM to hold 49 percent
of the equity in Wings including 10.544 percent of the voting interest
free of the voting trust.. . with any equity in excess of 49 percent to
continue to be held in the trust; (3) permit KLM to designate three
members of the Wings board of directors after that board has been
increased from 12 to 15 members; and (4) remove the financial
reporting conditions contained in the order.
Id. at *8-9 (footnote omitted).
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that control resided firmly with the U.S. equity holders in
Wings rather than with KLM as found in Wings I.'o' The
DOT based its new decision on its reassessment of "the complex-
ities of today's corporate and financial environment."' ' Based
on this new control test, the DOT modified the existing or-
der.'" The DOT allowed foreign investors to hold up to 49%
of the total equity investment, including both voting and non-
voting stock, provided that the investors did not hold more than
the statutorily prescribed 25% of voting equity.1 7 Also central
to the Wings II decision was the DOT's changed position allow-
ing the conversion of the excess equity interest into debt. 08
In Wings II, the DOT indicated that debt held by a foreign
airline would not constitute foreign control unless the debt
instrument provided the lender with special rights that would
imply control. 109
In addition to allowing increased foreign equity investment,
the DOT also permitted KLM other rights which it had previ-
ously held would lead to excessive control. For example, the
DOT allowed KLM to increase its representatives on the Board
as long as a foreign citizen was not Chairperson of the Board
and a disproportionate number of KLM representatives did not
sit on important committees."0
The decision in Wings II represents the latest DOT interpre-
tation of the citizenship requirement in the FAVA."' Wings
II is significant because it liberalized the citizenship standard
for an airline from that set forth only one year earlier in
SAS/Continental. As indicated above, the DOT modified its
'4 Id. at *17.
105 Id. at *16.
"o Id. at *20. Elders and KLM could eliminate their interests in excess of
the 49% by (1) divesting it to U.S. citizens, (2) converting it to debt in which
the debt instruments confer no special control rights to the debt holder, or (3)
allowing the excess amount to remain indefinitely in a voting trust. Id. at
*22-23.
107 Id. at *9. Together, KLM and Elders controlled 24.999% of the voting
interests in Wings.
'08 Id. at *19-20.
'09 Id. at *21.
10 Id. at *13-14.
.The DOT specifically stated in a footnote that "the decision in this order
will constitute a part of the body of our precedent to be considered in the
disposition of future cases as appropriate." Id. at *20, n. 22.
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own control test criteria established in Wings L These modifica-
tions suggest that the DOT is headed toward further liberaliza-
tion of limits on foreign investment in U.S. airlines.
The SAS/Continental citizenship test was composed of a
statutory requirement and a control test. In applying the
control test in SAS/Continental, the criteria considered includ-
ed: the percentage of voting shares held by the foreign investor;
the absolute dollar value of the investment; the number of
directors appointed to the board by the foreign investor; the
limits, if any, on the activity of those directors; and the require-
ment of disclosure to the DOT of future changes."'
In Wings II, the first prong of the test remained unaltered.
The DOT broadened the second prong, however, to include
additional criteria, including the citizenship of key management
appointments; the liberalized aviation relationship between the
U.S. and the Netherlands; and, most importantly, the relation-
ship between voting equity, on the one hand, and nonvoting
equity and debt, on the other."' The DOT stated that the
additional criteria were necessary for the control test to reflect
changes in the airline industry."4
The DOT's recognition of the new environment in which
airlines operate is important in that it demonstrates that the
FAVA's general purposes of safety and national security are no
longer the only goals involved in legislating limits on foreign
investment in U.S. airlines. The DOT has recognized that
foreign investment rules affect the competitiveness of U.S.
airlines. While the dual aims of safety and national security
need to be safeguarded, the realities of competing in the airline
industry today require more capital investment.
The DOT's new approach permits more foreign investment to
flow into airlines than previously allowed. The current law on
foreign investment in U.S. airlines allows foreigners to own or
control 25% of voting stock and up to 49% of total equity which
was previously limited to 25%.11 These limits continue to
adequately guard the policy goals of air safety and national
security. This increased foreign investment in U.S. airlines has
not resulted in any significant increase in airline collisions or
l" SAS/Continental, supra note 68, at *12-15.
113 Wings II, supra note 85, at *17, *19-20.
114 Id. at *19.
115 See id.
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accidents." 6 Moreover, national security has not been sacri-
ficed because U.S. citizens continue to "control" all domestic
airlines. Actually, Northwest Airlines, the U.S. airline with the
most foreign investment, actively participated in the Civil
Reserve Air Fleet ("CRAF")." 7
Proponents of increased limits on foreign investment favor
an investment environment that adequately addresses the
concerns of reciprocal treatment and even distribution. At first
glance, the calls for reciprocal treatment of U.S. investors are
appealing. The public perception of unfair trade practices
abroad and the U.S. balance of payments deficit is at a near
fever pitch. That the public would demand policy makers to
hold reciprocal treatment abroad as a policy goal is understand-
able. However, a closer examination of the implications of
reciprocal treatment exposes the frailty of this argument.
Reciprocal treatment would require other nations to give U.S.
investors the same investment opportunities in their nations'
airlines as the U.S. allows foreign investors in its airlines.
Initially, whether U.S. investors would want to invest in foreign
airlines is questionable considering return on investment is
often superior in the U.S..' Foreign airlines invest in the
U.S. because the U.S. airline industry is the world leader and
has significant growth possibilities." 9 Furthermore, if U.S.
investors did choose to invest abroad, they would face invest-
116 The U.S. Bureau of the Census reports that the total number of
accidents has been steadily decreasing since 1975. U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1991 604 (1991). It
reports 237 airline accidents in 1975, 228 in 1980, 195 in 1985, and 155 in
1989. Id.
1.7 Ott, Foreign Ownership Feared, supra note 12, at 96. Twenty-six
airlines volunteered approximately 70 aircraft as part of CRAF during the
Gulf War. Id. "Northwest, a key CRAF member because of its high number
of wide-body aircraft, provided five passenger aircraft and three of its eight
dedicated freighters for the airlift." Id. Statistically, Northwest, which
represented only 3% of all airline participants in CRAF, supplied over 11% of
the planes. Furthermore, Northwest put 42% of its total number of dedicated
freighters at CRAF's disposal. Id.
118 See Senate Hearings, supra note 21 at 23 (statement of Timothy Pettee,
First Vice President, Airline Industry Analyst, Merrill Lynch Capital Mar-
kets).
..
9 Id. "U.S. markets account for 45% of the total world potential." James
Ott, Core US Airlines Battling Hard to Survive International Competition,
AvIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., June 17, 1991, at 169-170.
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ment rules which generally resemble those in the U.S..12 In
many nations, however, the demand for a commercial airline is
so anemic that governments operate money-losing national air
carriers for reasons of national pride, not profit.121
Even if U.S. investors wanted to invest abroad and were
limited by foreign laws, liberalizing foreign investment in U.S.
airlines would promote U.S. interests in four ways, despite the
lack of reciprocity. First, it would secure jobs in the U.S. and
keep airline assets at home." Second, it would strengthen
national security by ensuring a large fleet of commercial carri-
ers based in the U.S. to call into service if the need arose.'3
Third, it would further competition by slowing concentration
among U.S. airlines, thus enabling capital-starved airlines to
survive without merging or consolidating with the healthier
airlines. Finally, liberalizing foreign investment would provide
necessary inflows of capital to U.S. airlines, improving the
domestic airline industry's capital balance.
Even distribution is also a vulnerable policy consideration
for three principal reasons. First, in a free market there will
always be those who enter as well as those who leave the
market. Unhealthy airlines who cannot compete will be forced
to leave the market instead of being artificially propped up, only
to depart later. Second, foreign investors presumably invest in
the U.S. airline industry only if they can receive adequate
returns. If policy makers leave investors no choice but to invest
in the weakest of U.S. airlines, they would effectively bar
investment in the U.S. airline industry entirely. Third, domes-
tic airlines receiving foreign capital in exchange for equity take
the benefit of the foreign investment because they need it. No
U.S. airline would take capital from foreign sources unless it
needed to. Thus, even those supposedly healthy airlines which
mo House Hearings, supra note 13, at 123 (statement of Daniel M. Kasper,
Harbridge House, Inc.).
121 Foreign investment rules are not the obstacle to investing in foreign
airlines as much as the fact that few opportunities to invest exist because
most foreign airlines are government owned or closely held. Senate Hearings,
supra note 21, at 15 (testimony of Hon. Samuel K. Skinner, Secretary,
Department of Transportation).
' House Hearings, supra note 13, at 156 (statement of Secretary Samuel
K. Skinner).
' CRAF requires a large fleet as evidenced by Operation Desert Storm.
See Reingold, supra note 36.
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receive foreign capital are financially unhealthy enough in the
eyes of their managers to require a capital infusion.
Foreign investment, even if only in the healthier airlines,
helps strengthen national security because domestic airlines can
use the capital to remain healthy and expand. This leaves
fleets of carriers in the U.S. larger than those that would have
existed without foreign capital inflows. Competition also inten-
sifies because U.S. airline concentration will slow as weaker
airlines, receiving a capital infusion from foreign investors,
remain independent and survive instead of merging or consoli-
dating with other U.S. airlines.
IV. THE PROPOSED LAW
In response to a perceived threat of foreign takeovers of U.S.
airlines,'24 both the House of Representatives and the Senate
brought proposals in 1989 to further limit foreign acquisition of
equity in U.S. airlines."2  Both bills, however, failed to be
enacted.'26 Since then, the mood in both the House and
Senate seems to have changed, with new proposals initiated in
1991 to liberalize the limits on foreign investment in U.S.
airlines in certain circumstances.'27
Congress also seems to have recognized that limits on
foreign investment are linked to competition problems, as
reflected by the short titles of the House and Senate proposals
to amend the FAVA: "Airline Competition Enhancement Act of
1991"'" and "Airline Competition Equity Act of 1991," respec-
tively.129 One of the stated purposes of Congress, in proposing
these amendments, was to increase competition."0  In addi-
4 See generally House Hearings, supra note 13; Senate Hearings supra
note 21.
'25 H.R. 3443, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); S. 1277, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989).
"' For a general discussion of these proposals, see Brown, supra note 67,
at 1282-1284.
127 H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991); S. 1628, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 4 (1991); S. 1977, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 1980, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
'28 H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991).
129 S. 1628, 102d, Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (1991).
" The House proposal states, ".... for the purpose of enhancing competi-
tion among air carriers ...." H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. pmbl. (1991).
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tion, Congress focused on the effects on safety and national
security of limiting foreign investment.
A. THE HOUSE PROPOSAL
On April 24, 1991, the House introduced the Airline Compe-
tition Enhancement Act of 1991 ("House proposal"), which
Representatives Oberstar, Roe, Hammerschmidt, and Clinger
sponsored, and which Congress referred to the Committee on
Public Works and Transportation. 3 Section three of the pro-
posed bill, entitled "Reduction of U.S. Citizenship Voting Inter-
est Ownership Requirement," would allow non-U.S. citizens to
acquire up to 49% of a U.S. airline's stock under specific circum-
stances. 3 2 It would give the Secretary of Transportation the
authority to permit foreign investors to acquire up to 49% of the
stock if eight conditions are met.13 3  These eight conditions
The Senate proposal states, ".... to increase competition among commercial air
carriers ..... " S. 1628, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. pmbl. (1991).
13 H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
1 2 Id. at § 3(a). The proposed bill would no longer consider the percentage
of voting interest, but would consider the percentage of stock by vote or value
in determining the statutory requirement. Additionally, ifthe conditions were
not met, the current law would still apply.
"' Id. at § 3(a). The eight conditions are:
(1) the air service agreement between the United Sates and the
foreign country of which the purchaser is a citizen is a procompetitive
agreement which, at a minimum, allows those air carriers designated
by the United States to provide air service from any point in the
United States to any significant air service point in the foreign
country;
(2) after the purchase, the president, chairman of the board of direc-
tors, chief operating officer, and two-thirds or more of the board of
directors of the corporation or association which is, or owns or con-
trols, the air carrier would be citizens of the United States;
(3) the laws and regulations of the foreign country would permit a
citizen of the United States to acquire, under similar terms and
conditions, the same percentage of stock (by vote or value) of a person
who provides in the foreign country transportation by aircraft of
persons property as a common carrier for compensation or hire as the
percentage of ownership which the person making the purchase would
have in the air carrier after the purchase;
(4) the purchaser is not a corporation or association of which 50
percent or more of its stock (by vote or value) is owned or controlled
by a government of a foreign country;
(5) the air carrier (or the person applying for a certificate under
section 401 of this Act to engage in foreign air transportation) is
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address many of the concerns voiced by supporters of limits on
foreign investment. This conditional liberalization is an effort
to balance the competing concerns of enhancing competition and
protecting national security.
These conditions also address public fears of an onslaught of
foreign investment. Several conditions limit foreign investment
to purchasers from countries which exercise reciprocity. For
example, the first condition requires that the foreign country of
which the purchaser is a citizen have a procompetitive agree-
ment' 3 with the U.S.. The third condition mandates that the
foreign country also allow comparable investments by U.S.
investors in its own airlines.3 The fifth condition further
limits foreign investment by addressing uneven distribution con-
cerns. 36 The House proposal accomplishes this by allowing
foreign investment in only those U.S. airlines that cannot find
capital from U.S. investors on comparable terms.
3 7
The remaining conditions address a more appropriate policy
goal, national security. The second and fourth conditions ensure
that a U.S. citizen will remain in control of a U.S. airline by
specifying the minimum number of U.S. citizens who must be
directors, officers, and owners of the U.S. airline. The sixth
condition explicitly requires that a U.S. citizen control the
airline after the purchase. Finally, the seventh and eighth
conditions require the purchase to be consistent with national
security and the public interest. This general statement on
public interest presumably will give the Secretary of Transpor-
tation the discretion to decide that transactions not furthering
the stated goals of protecting national security, maintaining
unlikely to be able to provide, or to continue to provide, air transpor-
tation without the revenues which would be derived from the sale of
the stock and no citizen of the United States is willing to purchase
the stock under comparable terms and conditions;
(6) after the purchase, a citizen of the United States would have the
power to exercise control over the air carrier;
(7) the purchase is consistent with the national security interests of
the United States; and
(8) the purchase is otherwise in the public interest.
Id.
13 H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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safety, and enhancing competition will not benefit from the
liberalized limits."s
B. THE SENATE PROPOSAL
On August 2, 1991, Senators McCain, Danforth, and
Kassebaum introduced the Airline Competition Equity Act of
1991 ("Senate proposal") which Congress then referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 3 9
Section 4 of the proposed bill, entitled "Foreign Investment in
Air Carriers", would allow non-U.S. citizens to own or control up
to 25% of equity and up to 25% of voting interest.140 Alterna-
tively, it would allow non-U.S. citizens to own or control up to
49% of the equity or voting interest if the Secretary of Transpor-
tation authorized the transaction.' 4' Like the House proposal,
the transaction must meet certain conditions before gaining
authorization from the Secretary of Transportation. 4 '
While the Senate stated its proposed conditions more gener-
ally than did the House proposal, the two sets of conditions are
similar in most respects. For example, the first and second
conditions address the reciprocity concern by requiring the
138 Note that while the purpose of the proposed bill is to enhance competi-
tion, none of the conditions specifically states that the Secretary may permit
the purchase of up to 49% of a U.S. airline's stock when competition requires
it.
S. 1628, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
'40 Id. § 4(a).
141 Id.
' Id. § 4(b). The conditions are:
(1) the investment laws of the country of nationality of each foreign
person involved in the transaction provide reciprocal rights for air
carriers and other citizens of the United States to invest in a foreign
air carrier of that country's flag;
(2) the United States has a procompetitive aviation agreement with
the country of nationality of each foreign person involved in the
transaction;
(3) no foreign person involved in the transaction is substantially
owned or controlled by a foreign government;
(4) competition in the domestic airline industry will be enhanced by
the transaction; and
(5) the increased percentage of foreign ownership or control will not
adversely affect the national security interest of the United States or
unfairly disadvantage United States aircraft manufacturers.
Id. § 4(b).
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foreign investor's country to give reciprocal investment and
operating opportunities to U.S. citizens. 143 The Senate propos-
al adds a restriction that a foreign government may not control
the foreign investor.'" The Senate proposal adds two general
provisions: one regarding competition'4 5 and the other, na-
tional security. 1
46
C. PROBLEMS WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL PROPOSALS
Both the House and Senate proposals inadequately attempt
to liberalize foreign investment policy because the conditions
they impose are both too general and too specific. First, very
specific and narrow conditions act as a hindrance to liberaliza-
tion because they may not allow enough flexibility. The House
proposal, for example, has specific citizenship requirements for
directors and managers. These requirements may not prove to
be in the best interest of the airline industry. In light of the
rapidly changing financial world and the changing needs of U.S.
national security, the DOT is better suited than Congress to
evaluate transactions. The DOT can react more quickly to the
changing business environment, as demonstrated in the Wings
II order. An example of a condition that leaves enough flexibili-
ty is one in the Senate proposal that simply calls for the protec-
tion of national security and the nonparticipation by foreign
governments in transactions. This would enable the law to
better reflect and respond to the realities of today's financial
world.
Second, when the conditions are too general, the unfettered
discretion available to the Secretary of Transportation may
prohibit even transactions that meet all the other requirements.
For example, the House proposal requires that the transaction
be in the public interest, but it contains no explanation of what
constitutes a valid policy concern, effectively giving the Secre-
tary unfettered discretion. The Secretary might potentially
misuse this discretion to limit investment more than Congress
intended. More cynically, the public interest condition does not
limit the influence of personal views regarding foreign invest-
ment or political considerations on the Secretary's decisions.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
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Given the inevitable changes in the Secretary's office, such
unlimited discretion would lead to an absence of uniformity and
predictability. This potential misuse of discretion would lead to
uncertainty in the market. Consequently, foreign investors, not
knowing how to properly structure their transactions, would shy
away from investment opportunities in U.S. airlines.
Additionally, one condition of the Senate proposal requires
transactions to enhance competition. The usefulness of a
condition addressing the competition concern would depend
largely on the interpretation of the statute by the Secretary.
The inherent difficulty of quantifying the "enhancement of
competition" requirement would once again allow the Secretary
to use his discretion.
D. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION RESPONSE
The Bush Administration currently supports a "substantially
higher percentage" of foreign ownership in the voting interests
of U.S. airlines than allowed by current law. 47 Not surpris-
ingly, DOT Secretary Samuel Skinner has come out in favor of
the House proposal that would allow foreign investors to own
49% of the stock.1' The Secretary's view is "that a genuine
globalization of airline companies is on the horizon."'49  The
Secretary further stated that the U.S. must "create an environ-
ment more receptive to foreign investment in the U.S. airline
industry."'5 0  The Administration's new policy tries to help
U.S. carriers to compete more effectively in world markets, and
to persuade foreign governments to eliminate subsidies to
carriers and manufacturers.15 ' This policy is premised on the
belief that these industries can accommodate increased foreign
investment without sacrificing national security concerns."'
Finally, the administration currently views the issue of recipro-
cal investment opportunities as one best taken up in multilater-
al and bilateral negotiations to deregulate international aviation
14 7BushAdministration Moves Toward Liberalized Foreign Ownership, 304
AvIATION DAILY at 563 (1991).
" Id., (referring to H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)).
49 Id.
150.Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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markets and to encourage free global competition for air trans-
portation.'53
V. ANALYSIS
A. ARE THE PROPOSALS AN IMPROVEMENT OVER THE
CURRENT LAW
The current law must change because the FAVA unnecessar-
ily hampers foreign investment in U.S. airlines and fails to
respond to the needs of the modern airline industry. Congres-
sional recognition of this problem has brought about the pro-
posed amendments to the FAVA.' M The question remains,
however, as to the extent to which these proposals improve the
current law regulating foreign investment in U.S. airlines.
The proposed law may in fact represent a step backwards
from the current law toward a regime of more limits on foreign
investment in U.S. airlines. Under the proposed law, if the
conditions are not met, foreign investment would be limited to
25% of total equity and 25% of voting interest.'55 Under cur-
rent law,'56 however, investors who do not meet the proposed
conditions would be able to purchase up to 49% of total equity
15 Id. Secretary Skinner specifically mentioned the Administration
attempts to bring the issue of reciprocal investment opportunities before GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Id. The GATT is a multilateral
agreement with the purpose of reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade. It
is the prevailing law on international trade among member states. LouIs
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1164-66 (2d ed.
1989).
1" S. 1628, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 2074, 102d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1991).
155 Note that these limits are the same as those imposed by the Wings I
order. Wings I, supra note 86, at *21-29.
55 Current law refers to the FAVA as interpreted by the DOT in Wings II.
Wings II, supra note 85.
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and 25% of voting interest. 5 7 The proposed law would, thus,
require those investors who do not meet the numerous condi-
tions to operate under more restrictive regulations than current-
ly in force.
Under the proposals, the maximum ownership allowed rises
to 49% of total equity if the conditions are met. The conditions,
however, are so onerous that few transactions involving foreign
investment would satisfy all the requirements. Additionally,
the proposed reciprocity conditions would needlessly prohibit
many transactions that might otherwise enhance competition
without sacrificing safety or national security. Finally, the
Secretary would havewide discretionary power under the broad
language of some of the conditions.' Whether either propos-
al would significantly improve upon the current law and gener-
157 Comparison of Current and Proposed Laws
Foreign Ownership Allowed (%) voting interest [ total equity
Current Law 25 49
House Proposal 25 25
-requirements not met
House Proposal 49 49
-requirements met
Senate Proposal 25 25
-requirements not met
Senate Proposal 49 49
-requirements met
's The general terms of some of the conditions in the House proposal
would make it difficult to determine when the standards are met. For
example, what determination would be necessary to find that "comparable
terms" or "similar terms and conditions" had been met. H.R. 2074, 102d Cong.
1st Sess. § 3(a) (1991). Similarly, it is unclear what exactly would constitute
a transaction "in the public interest." Id. The Senate proposal poses similar
difficulties when it requires that competition be enhanced. S. 1628, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(b) (1991).
An illustration of the difficulty of satisfying the conditions would be the
NorthwestKLM deal. Under the House proposal, the deal would have been
stopped because Northwest did not necessarily need the money to continue to
operate (or survive). Under the Senate proposal, the deal would have been
stopped because competition was not necessarily enhanced.
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ally liberalize limits on foreign investment in U.S. airlines
beyond existing levels remains unclear.1 9
The Congressional proposals recognize the difficult balancing
necessary both to promote competition and to protect national
security. An inherent tension exists between furthering the
goals of competition and national security. If Congress encour-
aged only competition, then limits on foreign investment would
be unnecessary.6 0 On the other hand, if Congress encouraged
only national security, then severe limits on foreign investment
would be preferable.' 6 ' The current law under Wings II both
safeguards national security and, to some extent, encourages
competitive practices by utilizing the control test and enforcing
compliance with statutory limits on ownership of equity and
voting interest. Similarly, the Senate proposal would safeguard
security and enhance competition to some degree. Unfortunate-
ly, the inappropriate policy concerns of reciprocal treatment and
uneven distribution hamper the proposals. A better balance of
the policy goals can be struck if, in liberalizing foreign invest-
ment limits, only the legitimate concerns of safety, competition,
and national security are considered.
Given the rapid globalization of the airline industry, one
cannot underestimate the importance of liberalizing foreign
investment in enhancing competition. Foreign investment is
necessary to boost the struggling airline industry. 6 2 Foreign
investment provides capital for new jobs, spending, and growth
in this capital intensive industry."s It allows capital starved
airlines to remain independent and operational instead of filing
for bankruptcy, consolidating with stronger U.S. airlines, or
ceasing to exist."M Foreign investment can prevent a handful
of monopolistic carriers from dominating the U.S. market.
1"9 Whether the proposals would be an improvement depends largely on the
interpretation and implementation of the amendment by the DOT or Secretary
of Transportation if enacted.
160 Foreign investments without limits would allow the market to work
without any inefficiencies and result in the most competitive market.
61 Increasing limits on foreign investment would maximize national
security because absolute control would be in the hands of U.S. citizens only.
16 Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 11 (statement of Hon. Samuel K
Skinner, Secretary, Department of Transportation).
6 d.
' A significant competition problem has developed as the concentration of
U.S. airlines continues. Ott, supra note 7, at 30.
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Foreign investment plays an especially important role when the
U.S. market cannot provide enough capital, or when airlines can
get funds more efficiently abroad." Moreover, foreign invest-
ment increases the availability of capital for expansion and
enhancement of competition in the global marketplace."
Increased foreign investment will, thus, place U.S. airlines in a
better position to compete effectively, both domestically and
abroad.
In safeguarding national security, policy makers must
consider changes in global banking and finance. Foreign banks
now play an important role in providing debt capital to U.S.
airlines. Foreign leasing companies also provide aircraft lease
financing for many U.S. airlines. In light of the large sums of
capital that foreign banks and lease companies provide, these
institutions could potentially exert considerable influence on
U.S. airlines. Upon examining the significant involvement of
such foreign financing in the U.S. airline industry, however, the
DOT ignored the sources of debt capital in scrutinizing a car-
rier's citizenship, except where the loan agreement provided
special rights to the debt holder which implied control.'67
Apparently, the DOT did not consider foreign debt holders to be
a threat to national security.
Congress should treat capital from nonvoting equity in the
same fashion as debt capital. In many ways, some forms of
nonvoting equity resemble, more than differ from, debt instru-
ments. Indeed, from the airline's standpoint, the only difference
between raising capital through debt or equity instruments is
that one may cost more than the other. Debt and nonvoting
equity simply represent alternative financing methods for
airlines. Nonvoting equity holders do not have more control
over an airline's activities than debt holders because both
groups can only exercise influence indirectly - debt holders by
calling in loans and nonvoting equity holders by selling in the
open market. Since debt capital is no longer a factor in the
control test, capital from nonvoting equity should not be a factor
either.
Accommodation of modern realities will not sacrifice national
security. The fear that a foreign investor would attempt to gain
" Senate Hearings, supra note 21, at 32-33 (statement of Timothy Pettee,
First Vice President, Airline Industry Analyst, Merrill Lynch Capital Market).
16 Id. at 32.
'" Wings II, supra note 85, at "20-21.
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control by threatening to pull their investment out of the airline
is misplaced. Investors who have invested large amounts of
nonvoting equity invest with the knowledge that they will not
have the right to vote their shares. They assume the role of
passive investors from the start. Thus, the possibility of profit-
able returns, rather than control, motivates their investment.
Additionally, a healthier airline industry may actually
enhance national security. The inflows of foreign investment
would ensure that real assets such as aircraft and airport
terminals would remain in the U.S.. So, in the event of a na-
tional emergency like a natural disaster or a war requiring the
use of such assets, foreign investment would ensure the avail-
ability of these assets. Recent airline bankruptcies coupled with
the trend among U.S. airlines to buy fewer wide-body aircraft
illustrate the impact of economic weakness on national securi-
ty. 8 The military has expressed concern that the civilian
airline industry may be insufficient to supply the needed air-
craft and personnel the next time the need to activate CRAF
arises." 9 The health of the airline industry is important be-
cause CRAF relies upon a strong and viable industry to ensure
ready access to the U.S. civilian fleet.7 Economic weakness
in the airline industry, therefore, may jeopardize national
security.
CONCLUSION
The current law, while remaining faithful to the policies
underlying the FAVA, unnecessarily encumbers foreign invest-
ment in U.S. airlines. At the same time, the U.S. airline indus-
try has suffered financial difficulties. Foreign capital infusion
may solve the airlines' problems, but current limits inhibit
foreign capital's entry into the industry. Consequently, a weak
and struggling U.S. airline industry remains.
The relevant policies of safeguarding national security and
promoting competition can be effectively accommodated while
addressing the need for more capital in the U.S. airline indus-
try. Congress should raise the current limits, 25% of voting
stock and 49% of total equity, to 49% of voting stock and no
limit on total equity. The current control prong of the citizen-
"s Ott, supra note 12, at 96.
169 Id.
170 Id.
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ship test ensures that domestic airlines will remain under the
control of U.S. citizens. In evaluating a transaction under the
control test, the DOT considers a multitude of factors, including
the relationship between voting equity, on the one hand, and
nonvoting equity and debt, on the other. Since the DOT already
considers the role of equity and debt as part of the control
prong, arbitrary statutory limits on nonvoting equity create
needless obstacles to foreign investment. A 49% limit on voting
equity, however, is statutorily necessary because voting stock
provides holders with direct control.
The current law and the proposed laws create a regulatory
scheme which' unnecessarily hinders the flow of needed capital
to U.S. airlines. As a result, the domestic airline industry
suffers. A struggling airline industry cannot advance national
security or competition. My proposal would allow U.S. airlines
access to the foreign capital they need without giving up control
to foreign investors.
Sanghoon Leet
t Candidate for J.D., 1993. I am grateful to Lawrence R. Fullerton for
suggesting the topic and providing ideas for this article.
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